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Der industrialisierte Krieg Mai — August Katalog, Brausche , pp. Vereine aus Trier und Umgebung feiern die Jahrhundertwende, in: Olaf Blaschke u.

Jahrhundertwenden in Trier und Umgebung, Trier , pp. Geschichte der Jugendgemeinschaftsdienste. Freiwilligendienste in Deutschland und Europa.

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He was truly imbued with the angry-young-man spirit that would characterize his persona both on and off stage. In Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Dahl argued that the chances for the emergence of democracy or, in his words, polyarchy depended on two costs: the costs of tolerating and the costs of suppressing an opposition.

When it is costly for a government to tolerate opposition, it will deny its opponent the right to participate in policy making. But governments also take into account their power to suppress an opposition, because even when the costs of tolerating an opposition are high, the costs of suppressing it might be higher.

The basic premise is that whereas lower costs of toleration give greater security to the government, greater costs of suppression provide greater security to the opposition.

Figure 2. However, this differentiation was not matched by social integration, which led to mass praetorianism or large-scale social movements.

The activation of the popular classes increased the costs of excluding them from politics. At the same time, other social sectors perceived praetorianism in the urban centers as threatening.

Thus, the costs of toleration increased more than the costs of suppression at time 3 in fig. The propertied classes were willing to eliminate what they perceived as a radical threat by excluding the popular classes from politics.

As a result, they allied with the military and established bureaucratic-authoritarian systems. In Capitalist Development and Democracy, the authors argued that power balances among various classes, the state, and civil society determined regime types.

The authors followed the historical sociology approach, most notably exemplified by such scholars as Moore8 and Luebbert,9 and argued that regime change was determined by alterations in the balance of power between classes and by the alliances they made.

Capitalism was associated with democracy because it undermined the power of antidemocratic landowners and strengthened the pro-democratic working classes.

Even though the costs of toleration and perceptions of threat were crucial, they were more or less constant across time. As long as dominant classes could keep the costs of suppression low e.

If the working class increased its own strength via alliances with rural or middle classes, however, they were able to bring about the introduction of democracy.

Even in cases where the right was weak, the rightist sectors managed, if they wanted, to gather supporters, change policies, and increase their power.

Since the costs of suppression were always at relatively low levels, the perception of threat that the left posed to the right was the critical factor that changed over the decades.

Surveying a diverse range of democratization cases since the mids and combining statistical evidence with a game-theoretic approach, Boix argued that decreases in inequality, increases in capital mobility, and difficulties of taxing wealth facilitated the creation of stable democracies, because the costs of toleration decreased.

Political mobilization of the poor changed the balance of power and led to higher costs of suppression, which encouraged democratization if the levels of costs of toleration were already moderate.

If the elites concede to democracy at first, levels of wealth redistribution decide whether or not the elite will continue with democracy or choose repression via staging coups.

Thus, democratic consolidation is determined by the levels of costs of toleration and suppression. However, when inequality is very high, the costs of a coup may be sufficiently low that it is attractive.

From the perspective of analyzing Greek and Turkish regimes, there are two strengths of the books written by Boix and by Acemoglu and Robinson.

First, these scholars show that different regime outcomes are possible by way of various levels that the two costs take. Boix saw the possibility of costs of toleration and suppression being high at the same time and thereby explained not just democracies and authoritarian regimes but also left-wing dictatorships.

Acemoglu and Robinson not only looked at persistent authoritarian regimes and democracies but explained why frequent transitions back and forth from democracy occur in some countries.

Second, these books bring the main findings of modernization theory and historical sociology together with rational choice approaches, while utilizing the framework of the costs of toleration and suppression.

Both works employ game theory yet situate the rational actors calculating which regime would produce the best outcomes for their interests into a context where class composition and broad socioeconomic changes, such as the development of capitalism, matter.

When socioeconomic development is regarded as the main underlying cause, a particular choice is made in terms of the main actors. They are mostly various classes or political parties representing them , and the military is assigned only a secondary role.

As explained in the first chapter of the present study, the literature on civil-military relations has identified different patterns of military interventions in different levels of socioeconomic development; however, these classifications have remained descriptive and not explanatory.

At times, the interests of the military and threats that the military personnel perceive reflect socioeconomic trends and coincide with the regime preferences of the upper classes.

At other times, perceptions of threat result from unconnected events, such as costly external wars, fear of losing autonomy, and civilians interfering in military affairs.

If the aim of the intervention is not related to socioeconomic variables, the coup is short-lived and does not implant an entirely new political system.

Shifting the focus to military interests also exposes an important dynamic in the consolidation of regimes. As had been highlighted by the democratic consolidation literature, relations among the elites, not only the upper or lower classes, lead to different regime outcomes.

The main actors are not always classes pitted against one another, the rich versus the poor, the elites versus the masses, or leftists versus rightist parties.

Both elite conflict between and among republicans and monarchists before the mobilization of lower classes and conflict between and among political, business, and military elites after the mobilization of the masses result in unconsolidated democratic and unconsolidated authoritarian regimes.

Conversely, unified elites, when faced with active lower classes, can repress more easily and consolidate authoritarianism. If the level of threat is high, the costs of toleration will be high.

If the level of threat is low, the costs of toleration will be low. To explain changes in Greek and Turkish regime types, I make two assumptions about the costs of toleration.

First, I assume that when elites are in conflict, the costs of toleration will be moderate. Second, I assume that when elites are in conflict with nonelite groups, they perceive high levels of threat.

In other words, when the conflict is between the elites and the lower classes, the costs of toleration are high.

When conflict is of low intensity, it is nonthreatening, but when conflict is intense, threat assessments depend on the source of the danger.

When large numbers of people who do not support the ruling elites or regard them as politically legitimate vote for radical parties that may change the socioeconomic and political system, they increase the costs of toleration.

However, when a group of elites challenges the survival of another group of elites and does not or cannot socially mobilize the population, they are perceived as representing a moderate level of threat.

The second factor that I use to explain regimes is the costs of suppression. There is an inverse relationship between the costs of suppression and resources.

If the elites have more resources, the costs of suppression will be low. If the resources elites have are limited, the costs of suppression will be high.

According to Dahl, costs of suppression are determined by two different types of resources: violent means of coercion typically provided by military and police forces and socioeconomic sanctions e.

I assume that the relative distribution of resources between the opposition and elites is determined by three factors.

Coalitions that form among the elites are the second determining factor. All things being equal, coalitions between the military, business elites, and politicians decrease the costs of suppression.

Third, repressing the opposition is easier for a unified military than for a disunited one. Hence, when the military is unified, the costs of suppression are low.

Depending on these three determinants, costs of suppression take on low, moderate, or high values. Mapping the Greek and Turkish Regimes and Coups Given the definitions and assumptions stated above, I make four main arguments to explain regime types in Greece and Turkey from the interwar period until the early s.

First, a combination of low costs of toleration and high costs of suppression produced consolidated democracies. When there were no threats to the interests of the elites and when conflict in the polity was only over policy, the costs of toleration were low.

Second, a combination of moderate costs of toleration and low, moderate, or high costs of suppression produced unconsolidated democracies with possible short-term military interventions.

When elites threatened each other, costs of toleration were moderate. If the elite group that attempted the coup had more power than the opposition, garnered support from other elite groups, and kept the military unified, the coup was successful.

If the insurgents who attempted the coup did not have enough power, lacked support among the majority of other elites, and could not command the entire military, their intervention failed.

If the insurgents were powerful but were not supported by the other elites, they might have captured the government; however, their rule and command of the military was fragile.

Assumptions about the costs of suppression Fig. Bringing together the costs of toleration and suppression Fig. Consolidated democracy Third, a combination of high costs of toleration and low costs of suppression would produce consolidated authoritarian regimes, as depicted in figure 2.

If the elites formed a coalition and if the lower classes were relatively weaker than the elites, the costs of suppression were low. In such a context, the lower classes remained disorganized or were forced to demobilize , no significant contentious collective action against the power holders emerged, and no significant elite group voiced its prodemocratic regime preferences.

If a segment of the elite believed that the lower classes were threatening the socioeconomic and political status quo, the costs of toleration were high.

If the elites were not united and if there were dissidents within the military, the costs of suppression increased. Because the rulers continued to be more powerful than society, however, the costs of suppression were moderate.

In these authoritarian regimes, significant groups had the opportunity to show their discontent, and they revolted against the power holders.

At the same time, significant elite groups voiced their pro-democratic regime preferences. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the arguments and assumptions advanced in this section.

Components of the Costs of Toleration The costs of toleration are defined simply as threats that elites perceive against their basic interests. The question now becomes, what kinds of dangers did the militaries and business and political elites perceive under various socioeconomic and political conditions?

Consolidated authoritarianism What Did the Militaries Consider as Threats? In Greece and Turkey, the militaries felt themselves in danger if their autonomy was challenged, if their well-being was undermined by cuts in budgetary support, or if their security was in question as unnecessary or prolonged wars were fought.

Some of these threats were introduced by the mainstream politicians. Especially if the armed forces were used as a police force to put down violence, officers preferred to autonomously intervene themselves, rather than to be blamed for the anarchy along with civilians or to take orders from politicians.

According to the first argument, the military is a middle-class group. As a result, it is biased toward the interests of the middle classes in general.

In cases where there is a strong agricultural upper class, an insignificant lower class, and a middle class trying to extend its influence, the military overthrows the traditional oligarchy and helps the middle classes grow.

In cases where the upper classes are weak and allied with the powerful middle classes, the military turns against the lower classes and intervenes to stop their advance.

Unconsolidated authoritarianism Fig. Greek and Turkish cases on the new figure This argument starts with the assumption that the military is a middle-class group.

It is true that most militaries in the developing world are made up of middle-class recruits. While this was also the case for Greece and Turkey, it is difficult to discern how much class identity soldiers carry from their childhood into their adult lives.

Because officers are recruited at a young age and go through substantial training afterward, soldiers in professional armed forces identify themselves as part of the military, not the middle class.

As a result, the military has distinct corporate interests that cannot be subsumed under class interests. Moreover, in this argument, the reasons for the intervention are mistaken for the results of the intervention.

Military interventions might have advanced the interests of the middle classes, but this does not suggest that the military intervened for this particular reason.

To be valid, this argument must demonstrate that the military consciously wanted to help the middle classes; otherwise, it cannot explain military interventions.

First, lower-class insistence on a change in the socioeconomic structure of the country was taken as a signal of a demand for economic redistribution.

Second, if the majority of the electorate did not support the ruling elites, they signaled redistribution of political power.

Especially during periods when the military held important reserve domains and tutelary powers, demands to expel the elites challenged the position and influence of the armed forces in the policy-making process.

Third, lower classes sometimes used violent means, such as strikes and demonstrations, to demand change. This endangered the security of the officers.

What Did Business and Political Elites Consider as Threats? As is well-known, most business elites vote for rightist parties.

This was the case in Greece and Turkey, as the analyses of the case studies in the following chapters will show.

As part of the right-wing coalition, the economic elites identified leftist movements as a possible cause of threat. Lower-class activism not only jeopardized the continuation of production and investment but also endangered physical safety and the security of private property.

Property-owning upper classes were sometimes also threatened by political elites, even those that represented the right-wing.

Business elites demand stability, want to be consulted in economic matters, and dislike rapid change in economic policies unless they are pushing for those policy outcomes.

Politicians not able to govern efficiently and legitimately were prone to create economic and political crises and thereby threaten economic interests.

Politicians who did not act predictably and failed to inform or consult the business elites before making decisions did not allow those elites to adapt to change.

For all these reasons, businesspeople sometimes felt threatened by politicians, even when these politicians represented the right and did not necessarily mobilize the lower classes.

Although some political elites in Greece and Turkey derived their power from economic dominance, some obtained their status purely by holding office.

The possibility of not being reelected indicated the likelihood of losing the status of being an elite group. It was also not uncommon for political elites to be threatened by each other and for business groups to view other economic elites as a serious threat.

Business elites naturally compete with each other for economic expansion, and there is always a degree of conflict among them.

In democracies, it is expected that political parties will also compete. Greek and Turkish businesspeople and party members did not necessarily view such market and electoral competition as a threat if they thought that the rules of the game were respected and that they had a chance to survive in the future.

However, if businesspeople believed that they were driven out of the competition because of forces outside of the market e.

Similarly, if politicians perceived that their chance to win elections in the future was ruined because another group of politicians had used subversive means, they became sufficiently intimidated.

How Did the Costs of Toleration Translate into Regime Preferences? When deciding which regime they wanted, Greek and Turkish elites considered their basic preferences and their expectations from each regime.

Therefore, elites wanted to know with whom they would share their power in democracy and which group would rule in authoritarianism.

Elites responded to these questions based on the expected political outcomes of each regime. They chose the regime that was expected to produce the best set of political outcomes for their basic interests.

Political outcomes included state policies e. This factor, however, became relevant only after the s in Greece and the s in Turkey, when the EU offered credible economic and social incentives for these accession countries.

Especially for some of the businessmen, who gained much from the continuation of close ties with the EU, international sanctions became an important part of cost-benefit analysis.

However, before credible EU accession paths, there were no international sanctions against military interventions.

In other words, it was usual for the assessment of the Western powers to match the beliefs of the elites and for the latter not to expect negative international outcomes for authoritarianism.

If the electorate was expected to oust the mainstream elites from power via elections, these elites predicted that their well-being would be threatened under democracy even though they might still be secure.

The existence of radical movements, demonstrations, strikes, and rallies that advocated political and socioeconomic change led elites to think that democracy with an active and challenging lower class would carry with it redistribution of properties and civil violence.

In most situations, both of these threats materialized at the same time: a significant portion of the electorate voted for radical parties, and the same fraction or various different ones engaged in radical contentious politics.

When faced with these threats together, elites preferred an authoritarian regime. Even though elite conflict was sometimes very intense, the lower classes still posed a higher level of threat than elites and encouraged a stronger reaction.

This is a matter of simple demographics: The electorate forms a larger group than elites and, therefore, is costlier to tolerate. Threatening mainstream elites in Greece and Turkey did enjoy support from the voters; otherwise, they would not have been threatening in the first place.

The support they garnered, however, was different from that of political parties that mobilized the lower classes for the purposes of overthrowing the existing order, such as the communists.

But this incorporation did not result in the radicalization or social mobilization of the peasants and workers. Quite to the contrary, in exchange for the private and public goods these parties provided, the lower classes remained organizationally weak and politically passive.

However, democracy was not too costly to tolerate if it was believed that the majority of the lower classes would vote for nonthreatening elites after dangerous parties were ousted from power by a short-lived coup.

This is why radical political parties that came to power but did not socially mobilize the lower classes to frequent demonstrations, terrorist activities, or strikes were responded to by short-lived coups rather than authoritarianism.

It was expected that the tranquil public would turn toward mainstream representatives once the radical elites were repressed.

In other words, such unification and pacts lower the costs of toleration. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley explain, Acknowledgment of a common set of democratic norms of behavior reduces uncertainty.

And insofar as losing in a political conflict is not usually perceived as posing a direct threat to the physical or material well-being of either side, the intensity of the conflict is mitigated, and incumbents who lose an election are more willing to step down, confident that they will survive and perhaps return to power at some point in the future.

The majority of the officers did not consider intervening after the s, because there were no substantial threats to their interests.

In other words, if there is no good reason i. This is why, for democratic consolidation, it was essential for the Greek and Turkish militaries to feel unthreatened.

Costs of suppression levels depend on the values each determinant takes. This section analyzes the three determinants in detail. The reasons for the supremacy of the military and the possibility of its relative decline are mostly historical and unique to each country; therefore, I leave their detailed discussion in this book to the chapters that analyze the case studies.

Here, I identify six general trends that will be useful for comparative purposes. First, in the wake of wars of independence and during the creation of new states, both Greek and Turkish societies and their strongmen i.

Even though the Ottoman state had given local power to these notables before the war, the new Greek monarchic state challenged their power, and politics became the only means of extracting the economic surplus during the oligarchic democracy period.

The Turkish War of Independence swept the Ottoman state elite completely aside and caused economic elites, who were religious and ethnic minorities, to flee the country.

The only remaining group consisted of military and civilian bureaucrats, whose top leadership became the new political elite.

Second, in subsequent years, external military threats helped create strong and autonomous militaries in Greece and Turkey.

In time, the military was able to use its resources against internal enemies as well. After the Second World War, the relative dominance of the armed forces was maintained in Greece and Turkey with the help of military aid, training, and advice from the British and, especially, the Americans.

Even though the United States has never directly staged an intervention in these countries, military aid had important implications in keeping the armed forces strong.

The mutineers gained important initial advantages if they were able to capture strategic locations quickly, maintain the secrecy of their conspiracy until the day of the intervention, manage to coordinate action among different units, and communicate with different regions and cities.

Several military interventions in Greece and Turkey, such as the coup in Turkey and the takeover in Greece, were carried out by small numbers of middle-ranking officers, who, partly due to good planning, were still able to take over the government and utilize the resources of the military.

Not all cliques were that skillful: the coup attempt in Turkey and the failed intervention in Greece could not succeed partly because of insufficient planning.

In terms of costs of toleration, the rising of the lower classes increases the perception of threat and might trigger a military intervention.

Its political strength limits regime autonomy and raises the costs of repression. In Greece, the immigrants arriving from Turkey in the s and German occupation during the Second World War also contributed to the growing strength of the lower classes.

The relative increase in the powers of the lower classes in the s was met with repression by the political elites in collaboration with the military, which was more powerful.

The military lost its supremacy only when the elite coalition that used to support the military broke down and when, as a result, the lower classes found a chance to ally with the elites.

When the lower classes endorsed the democratization project of the political right during the s, a broad societal alliance against the military was formed.

The active population remained disorganized and small in number. Contrary to the Greek experience in the same years, the option of allying with the upper classes was closed.

The elites perceived the terrorist and violent activities of the lower classes as a serious threat and supported the military coup in This changed only in the early s, when political and business elites, along with the majority of the electorate, coalesced around their support to push the military back to its barracks.

Faced with a relatively unified and determined upper- and lower-class coalition, the military had to let go of its political prerogatives.

A fifth contributing factor in Greece that resulted in the decrease of the powers of the military was the way the authoritarian regime collapsed in The sudden and unplanned collapse of the junta due to an external war diminished the power of the military and decreased its bargaining position in attaining reserve domains and tutelary prerogatives after democratization.

Contrarily, after military coups in Turkey, the armed forces themselves planned the transitions to democracy. Baart Jacques A.

Beneat Jacques Neveu Jacques Palicot Jacques P. Barber Jacques Pepin Jacques Periaux Jacques P. Jacques Robert Jacques Rougerie Jacques S.

Abramowicz Jacques Sesiano Jacques Steenkamp Jacques Thomassen Jacques Thorens Jacques Van Ruiten Jacques Velu Jacques Veron Jacques Vicens Jacques Villain Jacques Yonnet Jacques Yves Cousteau Jacques Zimmer Jacqui Briggs Jacquie Gering Jacquie Mcdonald Jacquie Mcnish Jacquie Rand Jacquie T.

Keer Jacquie Wakeford Jacqui Melville Jacqui Nelson Jacqui True Jacquleline Webb Jac Scott J. Cuddon J.

Culican J A Cury Jac Vennix Jac Weller Jacynthe Pouliot Jad Adams Jadah Sellner J. Adam Carter J. Adam Tooze Jada Ryker Jade Jones Jade K.

Scott Jaden Hair Jaden Tanner Jad G. Atallah Jadie J. Oh Jae Kwang Kim Jae Myong Koh Jae Ro Jaeseok Kim Jae Song Jae Steele Jae-Won Oh Jae-Young Lee Jafar Golzarian Jaffe J.

Thomson Jagadeesh Bayry Jagadish Jagan A Pillai Jagannathan Kanniah Jagannathan Sarangapani Jagannathan Thirumalai Jagannath Malik Jagat Jasjit Singh Jagdeep Kaur Jagdeep S.

Bhandari Jagdish Bhagwati Jagdish Chander Dagar Jagdish Chandra Jagdish Mehra Jagdish Sheth Jaggia Jagmohan L.

Humar Jagmohan Singh Jago Cooper Jagrani Minj J. Guerrero J. Guerrero Jahangir Amuzegar Jahangir Hossain Jahangir Moini J.

Hans Maks J. Hillman J. Hitchcock J. Jahred Love Jaideep Malhotra Jaideep Motwani Jaideep Prabhu Jaideep Vaidya Jai Galliott Jai Krishna Jaimal Yogis Jaime Amparo Alves Jaime A.

Pineda Jaime Breitnauer Jaime E. Martinez Jaime E. De La Garza-Salazar Jaime Gil-Lafuente Jaime Gomez-Gutierrez Jaime Gonzalez Garcia Jaime Gutierrez Jaime Harker Jaime Herrera D'Arcangeli Jaime Jaramill Jaime Jo Wright Jaime Kurtz Jaime Lerner Jaime Levy Jaime Lloret Mauri Jaime Lowe Jaime Marcelo Altcheh Jaime M.

Monti Jaime Poniachik Jaime Primak Sullivan Jaime Prohens-Tomas Jaime Punter-Villagrasa Jaime Reis Jaime Richardson Jaime Schultz Jaime Thurston Jaime Uribarri Jaimey Hamilton Faris Jainendra K.

Jain Jain Malkin Jain Pushkar Jain V. Jaipaul L. Roopnarine Jaipaul Roopnarine Jai Prakash Agrawal Jairam Ramesh Jair C.

Soares Jair M Abe Jair Minoro Abe Jairo H. Cifuentes-Madrid Jairton Dupont Jai Singh Jaiya Jaiya Hanauer Jajuga Krzysztof Jake Allsop Jake Batsell Jake Bernstein Jake Bible Jake Block Jake Bright Jake Brown Jake Chandler Jake Daniels Jake Day Williams Jake Desyllas Jakeet Singh Jake Godby Jake Halpern Jake H.

Davis Jake Henry Jake K. Aggarwal Jake Knapp Jake Lin Jake Mcniece Jake Mecklenborg Jake Oresick Jake Page Jake Perry Jake Rivers Jake Rosenfeld Jake Shannon Jake Woland Jake Y.

Chen J. Akhavan J. Kiernan Jakki J. Mohr Jak Mallmann Showell J. Godzimirski Jakub Sawicki Jakub S. Schmidt J. Alan Holman Jaleel Akhtar Jaleh Samadi Jalem Raj Rohit Jale Tosun Jalex J.

Alison Rosenblitt J. Allan Mitchell J. Allay J. Allen Jamaal M. Zarabozo Jamal Barnes Jamal Berakdar Jamal J. Hoballah Jamal Jokar Arsanjani Jamal Joseph Jamallah Bergman Jamal Malik Jamal M.

Bullocks Jamal Moustafaev Jamal Uddin J. Mangan Jamari Lior J. Ambrose Little Jame Abraham Jamee K. Moudud Jameel Ahmed Jameel Jaffer Jameel M.

Al-Khayri Jameel Zookie Mcgee Jamelle Wells James A. Anderson James A. Athanasou James A Baker James A. Banks James A. Beckman James Abel James Abell James Abello James A.

Bennett James A. Brannan James A. Caporaso James A. Cherry James Ackers-Johnson James A. Colaiaco James A. Connor James A. Cook James A.

Cooke James A. Crank James A. Crowder James A. Cunningham James Adair James Adams James A. Davis James A. Dinardo James A. Dolan James A Dorn James A.

Duke James A. Fain James A. Foster James A. Franklin James A. Freeman James A Gardner James Agee James A.

Green James A. Grymes James A. Hall Iii James A. Harris James A. Heintz James A. Henretta James Ainsworth James A.

Jacobs James A. Kapalo James A. Klein James A. Lagro Jr. James A. Langbridge James Alan Shapiro James Albright James A Lee James A. Levine James Alexander Fraser James A Lindsay James Allen James Altucher James A.

Maceachern James A. Marcum James Ambrose James A. Michener James A. Milke James A. Millward James A. Mingo James A. Momoh James A. Morrow James A.

Murdock James Andrachuk James Andrew Lewis James Angelos James Angus James A. Owen James A. Primbs James A. Reilly James A.

Reinking James A. Rillema James Armstrong James A. Roberts James Arvanitakis James A. Scheer James A. Scholz James A. Schwarz James A.

Secord James A. Sherman James A. Speck James A. Svoboda James A. Thompson James A. Tyner James A. Vohr James A. Walker James A White James A.

Whittaker James Babb James Badro James Bailey James Bainbridge James Baker James Baldwin James Bale James Ball James Bamford James Banks James Bannan James Barilla James Barnett James Barr James Barrett James Barrington James Barron James Barter James Barton James Bassil James Baughn K9e0h James B.

Bartholomees James B. Bell James B. Breckinridge James B. Carrell James B. Conroy James B. Dabney James Beard James Beauchamp James Beaufoy James Beckett James Beidler James Belich James B.

Elsner James Bender James Benford James Bennett James Bennett-Levy James Berardinelli James Bessen James Beswick James B.

Foresman James B. Freeman James B. Glattfelder James B. Hobbs James Bilsland James Blair James Blake James Bloodworth James Blumenthal James B.

Maas James Bockheim James Bohman James Bone James Bow James Bowe James Bowen James Boyle James Bradley James Brandon James Braxton Peterson James Breakwell James Brickley James Brown James B.

Rule James Bryson James B. Serrin James B. Stiehl James B. Stoltman James B. Tschen-Emmons James Bucanek James Buchan James Buckley James Buckley Jr.

James Bunn James Burge James Burke James Burnett James Burnham James Burns James Butcher James Butterfield James B. Barton James C. Bradford James C.

Brown James C. Clark James C. Dabrowiak James C. Daly James C. Davis James C. Gerdeen James Chambers James Chartrand James Chatto James Chen James Chilton James Chin James C.

Howell James Ciment James C. Kaufman James C Knarr James Clackson James Clark James Clarke James Clay Moltz James Clear James Clifford James C.

Mcdavid James Cockayne James C. Oleson James Colquhoun James Comey James Connally James Connor James Cook James Cooper James Coplien James Corke-Webster James Courtney James C.

Paterson James C. Pile James Cracraft James C. Radcliffe James Cramer James Crawford James Crimmins James C. Robinson James Crotty James Cryer James C.

Samuelson James C. Scott James C. Tily James C. Udel James C. Ulchaker James Cuno James Curran James Cussens James Cutsinger James C.

Waggoner James C. Yao James C. Zimring James D Adams James Dale James Dale-Adcock James Dale Davidson James Damon James D'Angina James Daniel James Daschuk James Davey James David Draper James David Dunn James Davidson James Davies James Davis James Dawson James D.

Bethune James D. Bloom James D. Broesch James Deaville James De Clerck James Deehan James Deep James De Garmo James Delaney James Delbourgo James Dempsey James Dennis Lorusso James Dennison James Denton James Derek Smith James Devenney James Devillers James D.

Fry James D. Dunn James D. Gwartney James D. Halderman James Dickins James Dicks James Dickson James Dingley James Dixon James D.

Brown James D. Lewis James D. Lilley James D Louck James D. Louck James D. Luketich James D. Mauseth James D. Meiss James D Miller James D.

Miller James D. Morrow James D. Murray James D. Nowka James Doane James Dobbins James Donald James Donovan James Dougal Fleming James Douglas James D.

Reid James Driscoll James Drummond James D. Ryan James D. Scurlock James D. Spirek James D. Stein James D. Taylor James D. Taylor Jr. James D.

Thomas James Dugundji James Duigan James Duke James Duncan James Dunk James Dunkerley James Dunn James D.

Watson James D. Wells James D. Westwood James D. Williams James Eade James E. Allen James Earls James E. Austin James E. Barrett James E.

Bayfield James E. Brenneman James E. Brumbaugh James E. Burk James E. Burt James E. Crimmins James E.

David James E. De Muth James Edge James Edward Burton James E. Fleming James E. Galvin James Egan James E. Garvey James E.

Gentle James Eggebeen James E. Goodby James E. Goodman James E. Harding James E. Hicks James E. Hiss James E.

Hoare James E. Hughes Jr. James E. Humphreys James E. Katz James E. Kitchen James E. Kloetzel James Eldredge James E. Lewis James E.

Lidsey James Elkins James Ellison James Ellroy James E. Lovelock James E. Mark James E. Mazur James E. Mcclellan James E. Mcdonough James E.

Mcwilliams James Emery White James E. Miller James E. Monogan Iii James E. Morris James E. Novak James Eogan James E.

Perone James E. Pfander James E. Piper James E. Plueddemann James E. Ryan James E. Samels James E. Sherow James Eskridge Genova James E.

Smith James E. Tew James Etim James Evans James Ewing James E. Wisher James E Zins James Fairhead James F.

Albrecht James Fallon James Fallows James Farmer James Farr James Farrer James F. Cooper James F. Doyle James Feess James Fenimore Cooper James Ferguson James Fergusson James F.

Griffith James F. Haggerty James F. Hancock James F. Hollifield James F. Hornig James Field James Fitzgerald James F. Kasting James F. Kelly James F.

Kurose James F. Kwiatkowski James Floyd Kelly James F. Nolan James Foley James Ford James Forder James. Forder James Forman Jr.

JГјrgen Stephan

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2 Kommentare

  1. Ich tue Abbitte, dass sich eingemischt hat... Ich finde mich dieser Frage zurecht. Geben Sie wir werden besprechen. Schreiben Sie hier oder in PM.

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